VZCZCXRO1176 RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHNP #0036/01 1561534 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 041534Z JUN 08 FM AMCONSUL NAPLES TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6208 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 0942 RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0001 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0009 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 0073 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0092 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAPLES 000036 SIPDIS STATE PLEASE PASS TO ONDCP; TREASURY FOR OFAC E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/4/2018 TAGS: PGOV KCRM ECON SNAR KCOR IT SUBJECT: ORGANIZED CRIME IN ITALY I: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION NAPLES 00000036 001.2 OF 005 CLASSIFIED BY: J. PATRICK TRUHN, CONSUL GENERAL, AMCONGEN NAPLES, STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary and introduction: This is the first of a three-part series; this message offers some background on organized crime in Southern Italy and examines its political dimensions. Organized crime is one of Southern Italy's greatest challenges to economic growth and political stability, and yet Italian politicians, for various reasons, are unable or unwilling to address it in an effective manner. The major organized crime groups based in Southern Italy all negatively impact on U.S. interests. They weaken an important ally by contributing to corruption and stagnant economic growth, and they traffic in drugs (thereby indirectly providing resources to terrorist groups in Colombia and Asia) and pirated movies, music and software. The Sicilian Mafia maintains ties with organized crime groups in the United States, historically providing the American Mafia with recruits. Organized crime influences Italian politics, according to numerous experts, either by ensuring the election of their associates, or by keeping corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and law enforcement officials on their payroll. This corruption is a major component of the vicious cycle of poverty and the breakdown of the state in southern Italy. Part two of this series will examine the economic impact of organized crime, and part three will suggest why the United States should pay greater attention, and will offer recommendations for a broader strategy to deal with the phenomenon. End summary and introduction. ¶2. (SBU) Organized crime is a deep-rooted phenomenon afflicting southern Italy, but affecting the economy of the entire country and extending its tentacles internationally. Contrary to common misapprehensions, in Italy the mob is not one unified organization, but three main groups, each originating in a different region and each very different from the others. All of them impact negatively on U.S. interests. In Sicily, the Cosa Nostra has a long history of ties to organized crime in the United States. In Campania, the clans collectively known as the Camorra help flood European markets with counterfeit and pirated goods, including American-made software, music and movies. And from its base in Calabria, the 'Ndrangheta runs a lucrative drug trafficking business that extends beyond Italy. (There is also a smaller group in Apulia, the Sacra Corona Unita, which operates on a lesser scale, mostly via the protection racket; successful law enforcement operations in recent years have largely dismantled the group.) Despite their differences, all three major organized crime groups have some activities in common, including running protection rackets and money laundering. They do business with each other; for example, the Cosa Nostra and Camorra clans purchase narcotics from the 'Ndrangheta. They also have close ties with Chinese, Turkish and Balkan mobs (particularly Albanian and Bulgarian). According to a 2005 FBI intelligence assessment, there have been numerous instances of "opportunistic interaction" between the three main Italian organized crime groups and Islamic extremists. And all three have the ability to influence politics and politicians, and use that ability to varying degrees, contributing to corruption at various levels of the Italian government. In public documents, the FBI notes that all three groups have members and/or affiliates in the United States. Cosa Nostra: Unified Structure in Sicily --------------------------------------------- --- ¶3. (SBU) Sicily's Cosa Nostra operates throughout the island with a unified, hierarchical structure. Inter-clan violence is rare; the last major war between "families" was over twenty years ago (the conflict resulted in the emigration of members of the Inzerillo family to New York, where they joined the Gambino clan). Membership in the Cosa Nostra is selective, and the organization has recruited personnel from all socioeconomic classes, including professionals. The unified structure works well as long as members maintain their vow of secrecy. The Cosa Nostra's principal sources of income are the protection racket, NAPLES 00000036 002.2 OF 005 drug distribution, rigging of government contracts, trafficking in persons, loan sharking and illegal construction. Camorra: Gang Wars in Campania ------------------------------------------ ¶4. (C) The groups that operate in Campania are traditionally known as the Camorra, but, as one expert, former MP Isaia Sales, tells us, the label mistakenly gives the impression that there is some unified structure. In fact, many different rival clans operate in Campania, mainly in the provinces of Naples, Caserta and Salerno. There is no central organization or even a confederation; attempts by some bosses to unify some of all of these clans have failed miserably. Thus, there is no single "Camorra"; in fact, mobsters do not even use the word, preferring "O Sistema," Neapolitan for "The System." The clans' enterprises are conducted within territorial boundaries, which are constantly being tested, leading to almost continuous gang violence. Unlike the Cosa Nostra, membership in Camorra clans is open to virtually anyone, as each family seeks to build an ever-larger army. The "soldiers" come from the lowest socio-economic echelons (the "urban sub-proletariat," according to Sales), who often find crime to be their only avenue to regular employment. Many wind up in prison or die violently, factors that contribute to Camorristas' risky behavior. The clans' principal sources of income are the protection racket, illegal transport and dumping of toxic waste, drug trafficking, production and distribution of pirated and counterfeit products, illegal construction and trafficking in persons. Money laundering is rampant, consisting largely of investments in hotels, restaurants and small stores that also serve as a sort of life insurance policy for family members. Franco Roberti, the top anti-Mafia prosecutor in Naples, tells us that the powerful Casalesi clan, based in Caserta, has huge interests in the construction industry in northern Italy. Roberti adds that Camorra clans are making more money than ever from drug trafficking, partly because of purer and less expensive cocaine, and partly because they have eliminated middlemen and now deal directly with Colombian suppliers. The Camorra pays cash for drugs, or trades cocaine for hashish and heroin. 'Ndrangheta: The Most Dangerous of All --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶5. (C/NF) Our contacts both in and outside of the law-enforcement sphere agree that the 'Ndrangheta is the most successful and dangerous organized crime group in Italy. The 'Ndrangheta has come a long way since its founding by villagers; according to University of Cosenza sociologist Giap Parini, in the last thirty years the group has established ties with Colombia's FARC and suppliers of heroin and hashish in Central Asia, providing them with arms and cash, and has extended its reach throughout Western Europe. And according to Calabria-based Anti-Mafia Prosecutor Santi Cutroneo, the 'Ndrangheta is far more sophisticated and international than most people believe, maintaining bank accounts in Monte Carlo and Milan, and transplanting operatives to Colombia, Spain, Germany, the Balkans, Canada and Australia. The Italian Parliament's Anti-Mafia Committee recently characterized the 'Ndrangheta as having an international structure similar to that of Al-Qaeda. 'Ndrangheta membership is based exclusively on family (including marital) ties, making it extremely difficult to penetrate; arrested members almost never reveal information about their colleagues, as they are relatives. There is no central structure, as in the Cosa Nostra; autonomous 'Ndrangheta clans operate within well-defined geographic boundaries, and territorial disputes are settled through peaceful negotiation or arbitration. Parini asserts that these clans control the economy, politics and society in Calabria. The 'Ndrangheta's main sources of income (according to law enforcement contacts and open sources) are drug trafficking, the protection racket, NAPLES 00000036 003.2 OF 005 rigging government contracts, illegal construction, loan sharking and trafficking in persons. Both Parini and Reggio Calabria Prefect Salvatore Montanaro told the CG that the 'Ndrangheta pays the Colombian FARC for drugs with both cash and arms. (Comment: Neither of these sources is a law enforcement official; their comments on links to the FARC may be speculation. DEA investigations in both Italy and Colombia have turned up no evidence to support this allegation. End comment.) During a May 2008 visit to Italy, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip declared to the media that the 'Ndrangheta is a growing threat to the United States with a presence primarily in the U.S. Northeast. How Organized Crime Influences Politics --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶6. (C/NF) All three organized crime groups influence politics in Italy. Camorra clans have been known to "get out the vote" for local political figures, but often prefer bribes and kickbacks to trying to influence elections. If they want someone elected, though, they will buy votes; up until this year, when Parliament banned the use of cellphones and cameras in voting booths, the cost of a vote was reportedly a $75 cell phone. According to sociologist Amato Lamberti, the Camorra can move up to ten percent of the vote in Naples province. The Cosa Nostra has a reputation for being able to deliver votes in Sicily; a number of analysts attributed the success of Silvio Berlusconi and his Sicilian allies in 2001 to the influence of organized crime (the accusation, whether true or not, is not that there was vote fraud, but that the mob was able to influence voter turnout in Berlusconi's favor). The vice chairman of the Italian parliament's Anti-Mafia Committee, Beppe Lumia, claims that the Cosa Nostra controls around 150,000 votes, enough to determine whether a party achieves the minimum eight percent required for a Senate seat. According to 'Ndrangheta expert Parini, it is organized crime that decides who holds elected office in southern Calabria, creating a web of dependencies to ensure election victories for inept politicians that are guaranteed to produce policies favorable to organized crime. Anti-Mafia prosecutor Nicola Gratteri states that in some parts of the region, the 'Ndrangheta controls up to 20 percent of the votes. It is clear from our meetings with elected officials in Calabria that they are a step down in quality from those in other parts of Southern Italy; some are so devoid of energy and charisma that it is hard to imagine them mounting -- let alone surviving -- a real electoral campaign. According to former Senator Lorenzo Diana, an organized crime expert based in Naples, 34 of 50 regional assemblymen in Calabria have problems with the law. The corruption of elected officials and bureaucrats allows organized crime to win government contracts and sub-contracts, and to obtain permits and certificates to conduct illegal construction and transportation of toxic waste, among other things. In the end, even elected leaders without direct ties to organized crime often come to some sort of accommodation with the mob; as the GOI's chief prosecutor in Naples, GianDomenico Lepore, tells us, "The decision to live with the Mafia is a political choice, as is the decision not to make fighting the Mafia a priority." ¶7. (C/NF) In addition to the corruption of elected officials, organized crime in Italy has successfully recruited law enforcement and judicial personnel through a combination of bribery and intimidation. Many judges, prosecutors, police and customs officials have been exposed for collaborating with the Mafia. This corruption allows the various clans to evade justice, as well as to ensure that authorities look the other way when illegal activities are being conducted. One need look no further than the port of Gioia Tauro on Calabria's Tyrhennian coast for an example. Europe's busiest transshipment port is outfitted with the tightest security measures, yet according to public sources, the port is used as a drug entry point. The NAPLES 00000036 004.2 OF 005 port is also used in the illegal arms trade; there have been several seizures of assault weapons in recent years. Logic would dictate that the 'Ndrangheta could not move narcotics and arms without the acquiescence of customs authorities and Treasury Police. Honest politicians and judicial personnel who stand up to the mob are routinely assassinated (among the higher profile cases were the killings of anti-Mafia prosecutors Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992, and the Vice President of the Calabria Regional Council, Francesco Fortugno, in 2005). ¶8. (C) The pervasiveness of corruption -- Italy ranked 41st on Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perception Index -- has led to a breakdown of the state in large portions of Southern Italy. The central government has little control over large areas of Sicily, Calabria and Campania, where organized crime maintains a tight grip over even mundane aspects of daily life, such as renewing a driver's license. And this perception of corruption dissuades investment in the South, which further aggravates poverty and unemployment, which in turn feeds organized crime as it recruits desperate young men with no job prospects. A report issued in May 2008 by the think tank Eurispes classifies all provinces in Campania, Calabria, Sicily and Apulia for their susceptibility to Mafia penetration. Naples heads the list (probably because of the number of city governments dissolved by the courts) with a whopping index of 68.9 percent, followed by Reggio Calabria (60), Palermo (41.9) and Catanzaro (33). The reaction of Southern Italy's politicians to organized crime, even at the highest levels, seems to be one of either denial or defeatism. Campania Regional President Bassolino and then-Sicily Regional Assembly President Micciche both assured the Consul General last fall that their regions had largely licked the problem of organized crime. Countless other politicians argue that organized crime is so pervasive that there is no point even in trying to do anything about it. (One told the Ambassador that to defeat organized crime, Italy would have to go to war against the mob and suspend personal liberties in the process, but that to say this publicly would be political suicide.) Even Sicily's upbeat Industrialists Federation President Ivan Lo Bello, when asked in early 2008 whether it was plausible for a serious candidate in Sicily's then-upcoming elections to run on an anti-Mafia platform, told the CG he honestly did not know. ¶9. (C) These groups also try to wield influence through the media. One prosecutor told us of a newspaper in Caserta (Campania) whose sole purpose was to serve as a way for criminal operatives to convey coded messages to each other. A number of journalists who have exposed criminal enterprises have been threatened with death. Roberto Saviano, author of a best-selling expose of the Camorra, told the CG in April 2008 that it is not his message that has made him dangerous, but the fact that millions of readers have read and understood it. Saviano is now on the clans' hit list and is one of about a dozen Italian journalists under police protection, according to the rights group Reporters Without Borders. According to Lirio Abbate, a correspondent under protection in Palermo, "Violence is only one means of applying pressure. Journalists can also be corrupted and bought." ¶10. (C) Comment: Of all the social elements involved in combating organized crime -- including law enforcement, business and social groups -- the politicians, many of whom owe their very survival to organized crime, appear to be the least committed to finding a solution. Until this situation changes, even the best police work (and much of it is outstanding) will be unsuccessful in stemming the tide. "No one will win next month's elections in Italy, especially not the nation's citizens," warned Roberto Saviano, author of a best-selling expose of the Camorra, in a March 2008 "Time" magazine article, because "everyone seems dead set on ignoring the country's NAPLES 00000036 005.2 OF 005 fundamental problem: organized crime." The second part of this series of cables will examine more closely the economic impact of organized crime in Southern Italy. TRUHN